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Abstract  
In the EU multilevel polity, domestic interest groups seek to shape EU legislation by 
accessing both national and EU institutions. Previous studies indicated that institutional and 
issue contexts, as well as organizational characteristics shape their strategies of interest 
representation. However, we know much less about how alignments and arguments impact on 
their participation in EU and national policy consultations. Addressing this gap, we 
investigate the lobbying strategies of almost 2,900 national interest organizations from five 
member states (Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) on 20 
EU directive proposals bringing also a new empirical scope to the study of multilevel interest 
representation. The findings indicate that alignments and arguments shape the participation of 
domestic interest groups in consultations on EU policies. We infer from our study that some 
general predictions of interest group behaviour are overstretched and outline four variations of 
interest representation routines.  
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In European Union (EU) policy-making, domestic interest organizations articulate their 
demands not only vis-à-vis national institutions but increasingly also at the European level 
vis-à-vis the EU institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Princen 2007). Several studies 
highlighted that the groups’ lobbying activities are linked to their organizational 
characteristics (Eising 2004), their embeddedness in domestic contexts and multilevel 
networks (Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Kriesi et al. 2007), as well as the features of policy 
issues (Dűr and Mateo 2016). These studies yielded important insights, but fail to account for 
a considerable extent of the observed variation in multilevel interest representation.  
To narrow this research gap, we include potentially important issue-specific aspects of interest 
representation in EU policy-making in our study, focusing on how national interest groups’ 
arguments and alignments with state institutions impact on their venue choices. Studies on 
groups’ alignments with political institutions and argumentation patterns in a relation to 
multi-venue shopping are still a rarity, but we already see some useful insights. Hojnacki and 
Kimball (1998) and Hall and Deardorff (2006) indicated that groups seek access to like-
minded politicians. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) pointed out that interest groups prefer 
venues that are more open to their demands and adjust the presentation of their arguments 
accordingly. Beyers et al. (2015) demonstrate that business interests are more closely aligned 
with rightist parties in the European Parliament (EP), and that civil society groups are more 
closely aligned with leftist political parties. Adding to this literature, we scrutinize how their 
alignments and arguments impact on domestic groups’ participation in EU level and national 
consultations.  
Our contribution to the debate on the interest groups’ venue shopping is twofold. In 
theoretical terms, we present and test new hypotheses on how arguments and alignments 
impact on multilevel interest representation. We demonstrate not only that these factors have 
a significant impact on the choice of interest groups to whom they provide policy information 
but identify also systematic coping strategies with different alignment patterns. Empirically, 
we study 2,900 national interest groups from five countries that were vocal on 20 EU 
directive proposals which the European Commission tabled between 2008 and 2010. 
Including also nuanced controls for country and policy contexts as well as organizational 
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types we thus respond to the call for more rigorous empirical theory testing in EU interest 
group and policy studies (Beyers et al. 2014; Bunea and Baumgartner 2014).  
First, we review the literature to establish our hypotheses about the association between the 
interest groups’ participation in policy consultations and their arguments and alignments. The 
subsequent section outlines the research design and data. The following empirical analysis 
indicates how the route selection relates to positional and ideological alignments and 
expressed arguments. 
 
Domestic interest organizations and their venue selection: the relevance of 
alignments and arguments 
We study which factors cause national interest organizations to participate in consultations on 
EU policy proposals. In recent years, several empirical studies scrutinized the lobbying 
strategies of these organizations (e.g. Beyers and Kerremans 2012; Dür and Mateo 2016; 
Klüver 2013). These studies find that the national route is still the major route of national 
interest groups. While membership in EU level interest groups is a central element in their 
interest representation strategy (e.g. Eising 2017, in this issue), it is less common for them to 
voice their interests directly vis-à-vis the EU institutions. According to these studies, 
institutional contexts (such as the domestic modes of interest representation), policy contexts 
(e.g. distributive vs. regulatory policies) and issue characteristics (political or technical, 
degree of salience, extent of Europeanization) as well as interest group features (type of 
interest group, financial resources, membership base) account for variations in the 
representation of interests in the EU’s multilevel system. While yielding a number of 
important insights, their emphasis on institutional and organizational characteristics as well as 
particular attributes of issues has neglected alignments and arguments.  
We expand on these analyses by studying potentially important issue-specific aspects of EU 
policy debates. We conjecture that, to an important degree, alignments and arguments account 
for the variability of venue selection in the EU multilevel system. The notion of interest 
groups’ alignments with political institutions is rooted in the study of voters and parties 
according to which citizens cast their vote for parties based on their proximity to the parties’ 
ideological positions (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Transferring the idea of alignments 
to the study of legislative lobbying necessitates some modifications because here interest 
groups do not elect political representatives for the next term but seek to impact on 
legislation. And as executive institutions rather than political parties tend to be their main 
interlocutors in EU legislation, we focus on interest groups’ alignments with the European 
Commission that proposes EU legislation and with national governments that handle it in the 
domestic contexts and whose ministers decide on it within the EU Council. We distinguish 
among two kinds of alignments: positional alignments and ideological alignments.1  
Ideological alignments relate to general programmatic positions, ideas and values of actors on 
politics (Gerring 2001: 71-80). Several authors (e.g. Müller-Rommel 1988) suggest the 
ideological proximity of certain types of interests with specific party families on the left-right 
dimension, i.e. trade unions with social democratic parties and business interests with 
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conservative, Christian Democratic, or liberal parties. Given the prevalence of the left-right 
dimension in the EU member states, it is well suited to studying the ideological alignments 
among interest groups and political institutions in EU policy-making (see also Beyers et al. 
2015). Ideological alignments referring to the proximity of interest groups and political 
institutions on the left-right dimension are at the heart of lasting relations and durable 
alliances among these actors. 
Referring to the congruence of different actors’ positions on the issues in a policy proposal, 
positional alignments are prone to short-term fluctuations and ad hoc coalitions. We 
distinguish three general types of positions that an actor may hold on an EU policy proposal: 
opposed, supportive, or unclear/neutral. Our analysis will focus on two kinds of positional 
alignments and two kinds of misalignments, leaving out more ambiguous relations as these 
have less clear implications for venue shopping: Two actors A and B have either the same 
position on an incoming Commission proposal (A and B support it or A and B oppose it) or 
they have contrary positions (A[B] supports it and B[A] opposes it). Accordingly, aligned 
actors hold the same position on a policy proposal, whereas misaligned actors hold opposite 
positions on it. Given our focus on legislative lobbying, we expect that positional alignments 
will be more important to interest groups’ venue shopping than ideological alignments. 
Major studies of interest representation argue that interest groups seek out venues that are 
open to their demands (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998). Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) suggest that many groups prioritize contacts with like-minded politicians 
and provide information as a ‘subsidy’ to them because these advance their objectives in the 
best possible way. In multilevel systems, they will concentrate their efforts on the institutional 
layer that appears to be more amenable to their demands. In the EU multi-level system, the 
preferred venue of domestic interest groups depends not only on the alignment between their 
own and the national government’s positions but also on that with the European 
Commission’s position. Therefore, we test the hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1. National groups that support a Commission proposal are more vocal in 
EU level consultations than national groups that oppose it. 
If the national government as its most important addressee in EU policy-making takes a 
contrary position on EU legislation, an interest group needs to look for alternatives. In the 
parliamentary democracies of the EU member states, it is almost impossible for such a group 
to convince the national parliaments to reverse the government’s position because the 
majority parties keep government in power (except for minority governments which are 
common in Denmark and Sweden). In these circumstances, groups will participate more 
frequently in EU level consultations to impact on EU legislation (see also Marshall and 
Bernhagen 2017, in this issue):  
Hypothesis 2. National interest groups holding a different position on the Commission 
proposal than the national government are more vocal in EU level consultations.  
Ideological alignments may be as important as positional alignments because interest 
representation “is not just an ad hoc affair which starts when salient issues appear on the 
agenda, but an ongoing endeavour to establish social recognition and smooth-working 
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relations, all of which prepares the ground for exerting influence on a more persistent basis” 
(Kohler-Koch et al. 2017, in this issue). Establishing lasting relations with government and 
parliament will depend on the ideological outlook of these institutions. According to the party 
difference account of welfare state policies (e.g. Schmidt 1996), left-wing parties are (still) 
more prepared to engage in market and social regulation than conservative or liberal parties. 
The traditional proximity of trade unions to social democratic parties and that of business 
interests to liberal and Christian Democratic or Conservative Parties prove the point (e.g. 
Müller-Rommel 1988). It follows that business interest groups should have greater access to 
more conservative governments and may exit to the EU level when facing a leftist 
government (see Bartolini 2005 on the exit option).  
Hypothesis 3. Business interests are more inclined to participate in EU level 
consultations when facing a left-wing majority in the national parliament. 
The venues of interest organizations may also depend on the receptiveness of political 
institutions to their arguments (Majone 1989). We define an argument after Ball (1995: 3) as 
an ‘oral or written statement that advocates adopting a policy or justifies the decision to adopt 
a policy’. Actors in EU policy processes present arguments to substantiate their claims. As 
national and European decision-makers are unable to predict all potential effects of planned 
policies, they are in need of external information to reduce uncertainties, learn about 
alternatives, improve their problem-solving capacity, and win stakeholder support. Different 
policy-making institutions will be interested in different types of information (Bouwen 2002). 
Bureaucrats are said to seek technical information whereas politicians depend on political 
information about constituency support etc. (Dür and Mateo 2016; Beyers and Kerremans 
2012).  
We transfer the general idea to the presentation of arguments at different levels in the EU 
multilevel system. We assume that national interest groups present their arguments on an EU 
policy proposal to the national government which is their main contact in EU policy-making 
and able to represent them in the EU Council. However, domestic interest groups may 
emphasize different aspects of EU policy proposals (Klüver 2013; Eising et al. 2015) and 
present those more fervently at EU level that highlight profound repercussions of EU policies 
or to which EU institutions would seem to be more amenable than national institutions. We 
explore this proposition for arguments referring to expert evidence, costs and benefits, rights, 
national interests, and EU public interests. 
International policy studies have drawn attention to the increasing role of scientific evidence 
provided by experts in public policymaking (Haas 1992). Given the complexity of EU policy 
problems, both national and EU level institutions require scientific evidence when developing 
EU policy goals and instruments. Experts who provide such information on technical, legal, 
economic, or financial aspects help them to better assess the problem-solving capacity and 
feasibility of the debated policy options and instruments. This has already been shown in 
access related studies (Chalmers 2013) as well as comparative studies between the US and EU 




Hypothesis 4a. National interest groups will present expert evidence in national and 
in EU level consultations.  
Classic policy studies emphasize the importance of cost-benefit calculations for the stance of 
actors on policy proposals (Lowi 1972). The bulk of EU policies are about market integration 
and the corresponding market and social regulation. The abolishment of barriers to the free 
movement of persons, goods, capital, and services is grounded in economic arguments 
highlighting not only welfare but also major distributional effects (European Commission 
1985: 12). Given the centrality of the distribution of costs and benefit across member states, 
economic actors, and social classes to the justification of the EU’s core policies, these are a 
major subject in the EU level debates on incoming legislation. Accordingly: 
Hypothesis 4b. National interest groups emphasizing costs and benefits participate 
more frequently in EU level consultations than those that do not name them.  
EU policies reallocate rights and obligations across citizens, consumers, professionals, 
institutions and firms, both across and within member states. The rights EU policies confer or 
take away vary tremendously. They can relate to economic issues such as market access, 
entitle EU citizens to obtain health treatment in other member states, limit the abilities of 
researchers to use animals in experiments, or grant refugees more support in court procedures, 
to name only some of the issues in the studied directive proposals. Obviously, the conferral or 
abolition of rights can entail frictions for domestic political systems and trigger domestic 
contestation. The conferral of new rights to them will lead many actors to move to Brussels to 
support the Commission’s course of action where others will seek to move EU legislation in 
the opposite direction. Thus:  
Hypothesis 4c. National interest groups claiming rights participate more often in EU 
level consultations than those that don’t.  
Not only interest group scholars (e.g. Bouwen 2002; Tatham 2017, in this issue) stress the 
relevance of territorial interests in EU policy-making. EU policies must be applied throughout 
the union’s 28 member states and vary in their goodness of fit with national policy legacies, 
administrative settings, etc. (e.g. Risse et al. 2001). Therefore, information about member 
states’ interests in incoming EU legislation is indispensable to the European Commission. 
However, for two reasons references to national interests provided by interest organizations 
should be more appreciated in national consultations than in EU level consultations. First, in 
EU legislation, the EU Council – rather than domestic interest groups – is the main channel 
for advocating national interests. Second, given their accountability to domestic voters, 
national governments would seem more responsive than the European Commission to interest 
groups articulating national interests.  
Hypothesis 4d. Interest groups stressing national interests will be more present in 
domestic consultations than those that do not stress to them.  
In contrast, national interest groups emphasizing the relevance of EU policies for European 
public interests would seem to address the European Commission and the European 
Parliament to complement their routinely conducted national level activities. This way, they 
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respond directly to the aims of the European Commission (to promote the general interest of 
the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end, Article 17(1) TEU), and the European 
Parliament (that represents citizens directly at the Union level, Article 10(2) TEU).   
Hypothesis 4e. National interest groups referring to EU public interests participate 
more frequently in EU level consultations than those that do not refer to them.  
 
Control variables  
We include national contexts, policy characteristics, and organizational types as controls. 
National systems of interest mediation may impact on venue shopping (Marshall and 
Bernhagen 2017, in this issue). As groups from corporatist countries rely to a greater extent 
on national concertation than those from pluralistic countries, the latter should be more visible 
in the EU arena. We measure corporatism by means of a composite index indicating the 
centralization of wage setting, trade union density, and collective bargaining coverage rate 
(see Vatter and Bernauer 2009). We also control for national wealth by including the logged 
GDP/capita of each member state in 2008 in the analysis, expecting that actors situated in 
wealthier contexts find it easier to participate in consultations (Carroll and Rasmussen 2017, 
in this issue).  
From policy studies we take the insight that policy characteristics may impact on interest 
representation. On the one hand, we control for analytical categories developed in policy 
studies. We distinguish among distributive and regulatory policies (Lowi 1972) and separate 
also business regulation from general regulation and public sector regulation (Binderkrantz et 
al. 2014). We expect a greater amount of interest group activity in regulatory policy and 
business regulation because these include the bulk of EU legislation. We also control if the 
directive proposal is a novel or a recast proposal because in the latter case many interest 
organizations can build on previous mobilization experiences which should facilitate the 
participation in policy consultations. According to Dür and Mateo (2016), interest groups 
should be more active in policy areas in which the EU has greater powers. To indicate the 
Europeanization of policy areas, we draw on Börzel’s (2006) measure for the policy breadth 
of the EU. However, national groups may not simply follow the competence allocation of the 
EU treaties but address mostly those political institutions who they find should do something 
to resolve the policy problem. Accordingly, we control if groups find that the national 
government or the European Commission should resolve the policy problem at hand.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
On other hand, based on the categories of the Policy Agendas project 
(http://www.comparativeagendas.net/), we include two substantial policy areas that are 
characteristic for EU policy-making in the late 2000s to probe if these account additionally for 
the venues national interest groups seek out. In both policy areas, we retrieved a substantial 
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number of actors: in banking, finance, and domestic commerce 703 actors and in 
environmental policy 1,471 actors. Both policy areas vary across the type and length of EU 
intervention as well as national legislative traditions, which impacts substantially on the 
implementation of EU policies (Haverland et al. 2011). 
Finally, different types of interest may have different organizational capacities. Based on the 
Olsonian logic of collective action (Olson 1965), business interest groups as specific interests 
should be more involved in policy consultations than civil society groups as diffuse interests. 
We present the descriptive statistics of all variables in Table 1. 
 
Research design and data 
Our analysis is part of the wider INTEREURO project on interest group representation in 
Europe (Beyers et al. 2014). Building on issue based sampling we study the participation of 
domestic interest groups in national and EU level consultations on 20 EU directive proposals 
which the European Commission tabled between 2008 and 2010. After placing all tabled 
proposals in these years in a random order and moving downwards from the top of the list, a 
proposal needed to be covered in at least one out of two EU level print media (Agence 
Europe, European Voice) and two out of three national print media (Le Monde, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Financial Times) to make sure that it drew attention and was debated at 
both national and EU levels. We used English and non-English language newspapers to avoid 
a bias towards British actors. In each newspaper article, the coverage of a directive had to 
amount to at least five rows of reporting. As a result, our study includes a set of directives in 
the EU’s energy and climate package, some directives in EU financial market regulation, 
some aspects of social regulation such as child protection, animal welfare, and asylum 
seekers’ legal rights, such that a broad variety of EU policy areas is covered. 
We study national interest groups from five EU member states: Germany, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This selection of countries controls some 
national characteristics and while ensuring variation with respect to national wealth, state-
interest group models, and governing party ideologies. The per capita income in Germany, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands is well above the EU average whereas that 
of Slovenia is below it. The United Kingdom exemplifies the pluralistic countries while the 
other four countries are instances of corporatism. The ideological outlook of the parliamentary 
majorities in these countries differed when the Commission presented its proposals. Due to 
these differences, we expect the participation of domestic interest groups in the policy 
consultations to vary across countries. 
In line with the advice to identify the full population of actors involved in legislative lobbying 
(e.g. Eising 2016), we proceeded in four steps: We coded the actors mentioned in the media 
articles used for the sampling of directives as well as in two daily newspapers placed on 
different sides of the left-right continuum in each of our five countries.2 We also checked the 
official EU and national consultation data on each directive proposal using the webpages of 
the national ministries and parliaments, the Commission’s consultation webpage “Your Voice 
in Europe”, the consultation data provided by its Directorates General, as well as the EUR-
11 
 
Lex data. Then, we searched the web for additional actors. Finally, interviews with EU and 
national officials as well as interest organizations yielded an additional set of actors.  
In total, we identified about 4,700 unique public and private actors. More than 1,600 actors 
were present in more than one policy debate. A large variety of domestic actors voiced their 
opinion in the policy debates. We found 2,899 non-state actors from the five countries: 391 
civil society groups (13.5 % of all studied actors), 57 trade unions (2.0 %), 178 professional 
associations (6.1 %), 607 business interest groups 20.9 %), 803 firms (27.1 %), 219 research 
institutes (7.6 %), 383 institutions (13.2 %) and 261 local and regional authorities (9.0 %). 
Not all retrieved groups participated in policy consultations. Some were only mentioned in the 
media, presented comments on their web pages, or were named by our interview partners. 
Even though they are not held for each and every policy proposal in the EU, we study the 
participation in consultations for the following reasons. First, the EU holds policy 
consultations on the major directive proposals and these are a useful point of departure for 
sampling the involved actors. As the barrier to entry is fairly small almost all actors with a 
stake in the proposal are able to participate in these consultations and present their positions to 
EU decision-makers (see Bunea 2017: 65). Moreover, in many consultations, the actors’ 
position papers are publicly available, providing us with the bulk of the document population. 
The set-up and frequency of national consultations differs across countries: German ministries 
and the German parliament consult actors by means of an invitation using a closed list; the 
same goes for British departments and the House of Commons. In contrast, Swedish and 
Dutch state institutions use an open list and invite all citizens to be involved through public 
calls. The Dutch government organized about twice as many consultations on the 20 directive 
proposals than the German government.  
After collecting all 2,961 policy documents we found on the 20 policy proposals, we sampled 
them for the subsequent document analysis in three steps: first, developed an activity index 
for each actor. The more often the actor appeared in different venues, the higher his or her 
index value. Secondly, we made sure that our sample corresponded to the proportion of actor 
types (see above) that were vocal on each proposal in each country and at EU level. Thirdly, 
we coded a minimum of 30 per cent of the documents tabled in each directive debate. The 
smaller the number of documents found in a debate, the larger was the proportion of coded 
documents. In sum, we coded 1,010 policy documents for the actors at the EU level, in 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. This sample amounts to 34.1 per 
cent of our full population of 2,961 documents. Slovenian actors are not included in the 
document analysis due to different research emphases of the national teams in INTEREURO.  
Then, we performed a computer assisted qualitative content analysis to study the policy 
documents. These were written in four different languages (German, English, Swedish, and 
Dutch), which rules out a meaningful quantitative comparison. To identify the actors’ 
positions and arguments, six coders coded the policy documents according to a 
comprehensive code book implemented in MAXQDA. The code book included the names, 
definitions and short characterizations of the codes as well as a list of keywords. Each policy 
document formed a separate unit of analysis whose coding units ranged from one sentence at 
a minimum to one paragraph as a maximum. The coders marked the text passages (coding 
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units) indicating the positions and arguments of actors. Their training included test-test 
procedures for the different policy proposals, languages and document types (Krippendorff 
2004). Reliability was measured by Krippendorff’s alpha (0.739) with a percentage agreement 
of 87.4. After completion of the coding procedure, the MAXQDA files were integrated and 
transformed into a quantitative data set in which categorical variables indicate the positions 
taken by the actors (-1= opposed, 0=neutral/ambiguous, 1=supportive) and dummy variables 
indicate if an argument has been made in a policy document or not. 
According to the document analysis, 24.1 % (N=182) of the interest organizations opposed 
the Commission proposals, 31.8 % (N=240) were neutral or ambiguous, and 44.0 % (N=332) 
voiced their support. National governments were more supportive: Only 9.2 % (N=273) of the 
actors were vocal on proposals on which governments voiced clear-cut opposition, 22.9 % 
(N=680) were active on proposals on which governments held a neutral position and 67.9 % 
(N=2,016) are linked to supportive government positions. The correlation among interest 
groups’ and governments’ positions is significant, but small: Pearson’s r = 0.164 (P=0.000; 
N=705) pointing to only weak overall positional alignments.  
The usage of the studied arguments varies in our sample: 42.4 % of the policy documents 
include cost-benefit calculations (320 out of 754 actors), 40.5 % of them present expert 
evidence (305 out of 754), 23.5 % reference European public interests (177 out of 754), 17.1 
% refer to national interests (129 out of 754), and according to 9.8 % the Commission 
proposal is about the (re-)allocation of rights (73 out of 746). Usage varies also across actor 
types. Around half of the business interest associations (51 %) and firms (48 %) as well as a 
large portion of professional groups (44 %) invoke cost-benefit arguments. Business (28 %) 
and professional associations (27 %) present also more often than other actors scientific 
evidence to substantiate their positions (except research institutes – 41 %). By comparison, 
civil society groups refer mostly to European public interests (31 %), national interests (25 
%), and cost-benefit aspects (22 %).  
Among these arguments, only the rights-based claims (Pearson’s r = 0.178, P=0.000; N=746) 
and the tabling of expert evidence (Pearson’s r = 0.119, P = 0.001; N=754) are significantly – 
and positively – associated with the actors’ positions. This is different with respect to the 
government’s positions: Rights-based arguments (Pearson’s r = -0.163, P=0.000; N=596), 
national interests (Pearson’s r =-0.231, P=0.000; N=603), and European public interests 
(Pearson’s r =-0.262, P=0.000; N=603) meet with greater government opposition, whereas 
cost-benefit arguments are associated with slightly greater government support for EU 
policies (Pearson’s r =0.141, P=0.001; N=603). 
We measure the ideological positions of national governments by the RILE index which can 
reach values from -100 to +100. As it is formed by subtracting left positions from right 
positions on the covered items, negative values indicate more left positions and positive 
values indicate more conservative positions (Volkens et al. 2011). We weighted the RILE 
index according to the parties’ vote shares in the national elections to capture the national 
parliamentary majorities’ – and herewith government parties’ – ideological positions. Ranging 
only from -9.89 to 7.91 with a mean of 0.775, it indicates a preponderance of centrist 
governments. Within this range, conservative governments were more inclined to oppose 
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incoming EU legislation than leftist governments. The correlation among the weighted RILE 
index and the governments’ positions amounts to Pearson’s r = 0.421 (P=0.000; N=2,965). 
 
Empirical analysis 
As a result of the sampling procedure and list wise exclusion of missing observations, the 
number of observations reduces from 2,899 to 596 national groups when bringing into the 
analysis positions, alignments, and arguments.3 We test our propositions in multinomial logit 
regressions. The dependent variable has four categories. It indicates the participation in 
national consultations (N=1,395), EU level consultations (N=307), and in national and EU 
level consultations (N=277). It also includes those groups for which we could not find 
evidence of any participation in official consultations, but that were named in the media, by 
interviewees, or placed policy statements on their web pages (N=920). As it is the default 
strategy of national groups, the participation in national consultations forms the reference 
category.  
The regression coefficients indicate the logged odds to exit to the EU level, to take part in 
consultations at both levels, and not to participate in consultations, compared to the 
participation in national level consultations. We present two models. The first model includes 
the organizational, national and policy controls as well as the RILE index (model 1). The 
second model covers also arguments, positions, and alignments (model 2). Based on the chi2-
tests, we may reject the null hypothesis that none of the explanatory variables is associated 
with the outcomes. 
  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our interpretation concentrates on model 2 which demonstrates that alignments and 
arguments impact on the choice of venues. We single out those four modes of positional 
alignments that are central to our argument: joint support, joint opposition, government 
support vs. group opposition, and government opposition vs. group support. To facilitate the 
interpretation of findings, we visualize the effects of the corresponding four combinations of 
logit coefficients. Figure 1 displays the predicted marginal probabilities to take part in 
national consultations only, in EU level consultations only, and in consultations at both EU 
and national levels (multilevel consultations), holding constant common values of the other 
variables included in model 2. Figure 1a presents them for business interests and Figure 1b for 
civil society groups. 
 




Figure 1 illustrates that it is common for domestic interest organizations to present their 
positions on EU policies in national consultations and not unusual for them to be present in 
EU level consultations. In fact, many domestic groups pursue a two-level strategy in EU 
financial market regulation. We expected that interest groups concentrate their lobbying 
efforts on like-minded politicians and bureaucrats in the EU multilevel system. This is only 
partly true. The main effects of the interest groups’ positions on the Commission proposals 
are insignificant. Support for a Commission proposal does not per se lead a group to 
participate more frequently in EU level consultations which contradicts Hypothesis 1. Its 
positional alignment with the national government matters more to its venue choices. A 
national group holding the same position as the national government is more likely to 
participate in national consultations than a group holding the opposite position which 
conforms to our general expectation. Domestic conflict significantly increases the propensity 
to engage in EU level consultations (see also Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, in this issue): A 
group is more inclined to move to the EU level if ‘its’ government supports the proposal and 
the group opposes it. The tendency to exit to the EU level (Hypothesis 2) is highest if a group 
supports the Commission proposal and the government is opposed to it. In sum, it is not just 
the presence of domestic conflict that matters but also the direction of the positional 
alignment and the availability of a receptive venue at EU level. More generally, positional 
alignments lead to systematic variations of major interest representation routines. 
Many domestic interest groups indicate their opposition to Commission proposals to policy-
makers. This finding may seem trivial at first glance. However, it contradicts not only the 
presumption that interest groups concentrate their efforts strongly on like-minded actors but 
also findings of a major study on interest representation in the United States according to 
which “supporters of the status quo often choose to do nothing when advocates challenge 
their interests; they conclude that the odds are in their favour that nothing will happen (…)” 
(Baumgartner et al. 2014: 204). Unlike in the US, actors in the EU who oppose a policy 
initiative do not expect policy stability but policy change when the Commission prepares a 
policy proposal. Strong domestic mobilization sets in to prevent the EU bill from turning into 
law or to amend it (Figure 1) if groups find themselves in unison with government. Groups 
feel slightly less need to take part in national consultations when the incoming EU proposal 
finds their support and has also ‘their’ government’s backing enabling them to let the national 
government act to some degree as their spokesperson.  
Ideological alignments with the parliamentary majority parties also matter. According to 
model 1, business interest associations facing a leftist government are more likely to exit to 
the EU level than other types of groups (Hypothesis 3) which implies that they will also be 
less present in the domestic arena. When taking into account arguments and positions in 
model 2 this finding holds for all group types. As leftist governments were generally more 
supportive of the EU policies than domestic interests (see above), these may feel greater need 
to state critical positions directly at EU level. Moreover, according to model 1, interest groups 
are more likely to state their positions in both national and EU level consultations when facing 
a conservative government. Based on model 2, domestic interests engage more at EU level 
when facing a leftist government in support of the incoming EU proposals. These results 
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suggest that positional alignments include more precise information on issue-specific 
allegiances between groups and governments than the governing parties’ ideologies.  
Now we scrutinize the impact of arguments on the usage of venues. We expected that national 
interest groups will present expert evidence to national and EU institutions (Hypothesis 4a) 
and do not find a significant difference in the usage of expert information in different venues. 
The costs and benefits of EU policies are stressed by EU players and multilevel players rather 
than national players, which supports Hypothesis 4b. Recall that business interests rely 
heavily on cost-benefit arguments. Faced with the prospective costs of EU regulation, they 
present their concerns at both the national level and EU level. Some even exit to the EU level 
because the national governments in this study tended to support policies on which cost-
benefit arguments were exchanged.  
Actors claiming rights tend to participate in consultations at both levels rather than merely in 
national consultations which is consistent with Hypothesis 4c. They find it necessary to act at 
both levels because the re-allocation of rights causes frictions in the domestic contexts. 
Especially those actors that do not oppose the incoming EU directive point out their support in 
EU level consultations in addition to their presence in national consultations as governments 
were rather opposed to EU policies re-allocating rights (see above). Likewise, organizations 
pointing to European public interests tend do so at both levels which conforms to Hypothesis 
4e. In addition to voicing their support for the Commission proposal at EU level, they find it 
necessary to convince their rather sceptical (see above) national governments.  
Contrary to our expectations (Hypothesis 4d), the usage of arguments referencing national 
interests does not vary across different venues. As national governments tend to face 
Commission proposals with scepticism when perceiving that national interests are at stake 
(see above), supportive interest groups have an incentive to put also their version of the 
national interest forward to the European Commission. Note also that actors who do not 
participate in consultations refer only rarely to national interests, suggesting that these are an 
important reason to mobilize. In sum, our findings indicate that arguments are associated with 
venue choices. Actors raise arguments in EU level consultations in addition to their 
presentation at the national level rather than instead of it. This is particularly noticeable when 
costs and benefits, rights, and Europe-wide public interests are at stake. The results 
corroborate that actors do not just address like-minded political institutions in EU legislation 
but tend to engage in two-level politics to sway policymakers with contrary opinions.  
What are the major findings regarding our control variables? Group types matter less than 
anticipated, perhaps because the hurdles that must be overcome to take part in EU and 
national policy consultations are small. Civil society groups tend to exit less to EU level 
consultations than other group types (Model 2). They are more firmly tied to domestic 
contexts, relying on the mobilization of national publics and lacking resources to state their 
positions also in EU level consultations. Figure 1 illustrates that, in conjunction with the 
effects of the other variables included in Model 2, business interests are more likely to act as 
multilevel players and adapt more flexibly to domestic alignments than civil society groups.  
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National contexts matter. It is more common for groups from wealthier member states: to 
participate in domestic consultations (rather than not), not to exit to the EU level consultations 
(model 2), and not to take part in consultations at both levels. In Sweden and the Netherlands, 
our two wealthiest countries, domestic groups rely heavily on the participation in national 
consultations. Moreover, groups from the pluralistic UK are more likely to become multilevel 
players than groups from the corporatist member states. Pluralism provides a context in which 
interest groups have a greater tendency to engage in venue shopping. 
Policy contexts also play a role: Domestic groups are more likely to exit to the EU level or 
become multilevel players when facing EU regulatory policies. In response to policies that 
have (re-)distributive effects across member states they rely to a greater extent on domestic 
consultations. Furthermore, public sector policies trigger greater participation in policy 
consultations at both levels than business regulation. Previous mobilization experiences are 
also important. Recast directives are positively associated with the participation in 
consultations at both levels. Moreover, in more Europeanized policy areas, groups tend to be 
more active at both the EU and national levels only when not taking into account alignments 
and arguments. When doing so it is less likely that they exit to the EU level. Note also that 
these policy categorizations do not suffice to account for policy variations: Groups active in 
environmental policy-making are less likely to exit to the EU level and groups vocal on 
banking, finance and domestic commerce policy are more likely to become multilevel players 
than those in other policy areas. Finally, the perception of who should be responsible for 
dealing with the policy problem at hand is important. Groups indicating that the national 
government should do something are less likely to exit to the EU level, whereas groups that 
see the Commission in charge tend to become vocal at both levels. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis of political access and venue-shopping in EU policy-making has neglected the 
role of positions, alignments and arguments. To help fill this gap, we included positional and 
ideological alignments among state institutions and interest groups as well as the policy 
arguments in our empirical analysis. The findings indicate that these factors help accounting 
for the variability of domestic interest groups’ strategies and call for a more systematic 
inclusion of alignments, arguments and positions in future interest group studies.  
We provide evidence delimiting the scope of general predictions of interest group strategies in 
previous theoretical and empirical work suggesting that interest groups will ‘shoot where the 
ducks are’ – meaning that they need ‘to get themselves to Brussels’ where EU decision-
making power resides (Richardson 2006: 232), approach mostly like-minded actors (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006), or lean back if they support the policy status quo (Baumgartner et al. 2014). 
Focusing on the selection of venues at different levels, we contend that interest representation 
in the EU multilevel system follows task contingencies and organizational routines: First of 
all, national interest groups present their arguments and positions to the national government. 
Only then do they participate in EU level consultations as an alternative or additional venue. 
Moreover, they tend to address those political institutions they consider to be in charge of 
17 
 
solving the policy problem and find it easier to act in the EU multilevel system if they had 
prior mobilization experiences. Secondly, interest groups in favour of the status quo and 
opposed to a Commission proposal do not lean back. Expecting policy change rather than 
policy stability in the EU multilevel system, they tend to advocate their positions even more 
than those who support the directive proposal. Thirdly, national interest groups show some 
inclination to address like-minded actors, but this does not preclude them from approaching 
policymakers with contrary opinions. They tend to participate more often in EU level 
consultations when supporting EU public interests, but also when identifying sincere 
consequences of EU policy proposals in terms of costs and benefits or the (re-)allocation of 
rights.  
Finally, our study indicates that domestic interests have developed specific strategies to cope 
with positional alignments. We identified four conditional participation patterns (see Figure 1) 
that constitute variations of their interest representation routines. Joint opposition of national 
governments and domestic groups leads to joint domestic mobilization against the 
Commission proposal. Joint support results in groups more relying on the national 
government as spokesperson for their interests. Interest group opposition coupled with 
government support for a Commission proposal causes groups to engage in a two-level 
opposition, whereas interest group support in conjunction with government opposition causes 
them to exit to the EU level. The strategic flexibility of groups is contingent, inter alia, on 
group types, national contexts, and policy contexts. While business interests adapt their 
strategies noticeably in response to variations in their alignments with political institutions, 
the adaption of civil society interests is less pronounced because they are more firmly tied to 
domestic contexts.  
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Table 1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (N = 596) 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max 
Consultations 0 No participation 1 National consultation (ref.) 2 
EU consultations 3 National and EU consultations 
1.418 0.992 0 3 
GDP/Capita(log) Member states GDP/Capita (log) in 2008  3.531 0.110 3.43 3.66 
Corporatism Index of corporatism: sum of standardized scores 
for centralization of wage setting (1-3), trade 
union density (0-100) and collective bargaining 
coverage (0-100). Negative values indicate 
pluralism and positive values corporatism. 
0.279 1.861 -2.49 3.82 
RILE Right-Left index weighted according to parties’ 
national vote shares. Negative values indicate a 
leftist majority and positive values a conservative 
majority of manifesto statements on a scale 
ranging from -100 to 100.  
3.080 5.753 -9.89 7.60 
Civil society group  1 Civic group 0 Firm, trade union, professional 
group, research institute, institution, local or 
regional authority 
0.141 0.348 0 1 
Business group 1 Business interest group 0 Firm, trade union, 
professional group, research institute, institution, 
local or regional authority 
0.269 0.444 0 1 
RILE*Business 
group 
Interaction between RILE and Business group 0.449 3.524 -9.89 7.60 
Environment 1 Environmental policy 0 Other policy areas 0.446 0.498 0 1 
Banking 1 Banking, finance, and domestic commerce 0 
Other policy areas 
0.174 0.380 0 1 
Recast 1 Recast directive 0 No recast directive 0.221 0.416 0 1 
Regulatory policy 1 Regulatory policy 0 Distributive policy 0.944 0.229 0 1 
General regulation 1 General regulation 0 Business regulation 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Public sector 
regulation 
1 Public sector regulation 0 Business regulation 0.193 0.395 0 1 
Europeanization of 
policy area 
1 Only national powers in the policy area 2 
Mostly national powers 3 National and EU 
powers 4 Mostly EU powers 5 Only EU powers 
3.731 0.621 1.5 4 
Interest group 
position opposed  
1 IG opposed to Commission proposal  0 IG 
neutral or ambiguous  
0.228 0.420 0 1 
Interest group 
position supportive  
1 IG support of Commission proposal  0 IG 
neutral or ambiguous  
0.482 0.500 0 1 
Government position 
opposed  
1 Government opposed to Commission proposal  
0 Government neutral or ambiguous  
0.138 0.345 0 1 
Government position 
supportive  
1 Government support for Commission proposal  
0 Government neutral or ambiguous  
0.559 0.497 0 1 
Rights 1 According to the author of the text the essence 
of this proposal at a macro level is rights 0 The 
essence of the proposal is not about rights.  
0.106 0.308 0 1 
Evidence 1 The arguments refer to evidence generated by 
experts or in expert groups 0 The arguments do 
not refer to expert evidence. 
0.404 0.491 0 1 
Costs & benefits 1 The arguments point to the distribution of costs 
or benefits. 0 The arguments do not point to the 
distribution of costs or benefits. 
0.436 0.496 0 1 
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National interest 1 The arguments reference national interests of 
the EU member states. 0 The arguments do not 
reference national interests of the EU member 
states. 
0.188 0.391 0 1 
EU public interests 1 The arguments reference the interests of the 
European public (the EU citizens at large, 
referring to individuals in potentially large 
number). 0 The arguments do not reference the 
interests of the European public. 




1 The European Commission should do 
something about the policy problem. 0 The 
European Commission is not named.  
0.223 0.417 0 1 
National govern-
ment: do something 
1 The national government should do something 
about the policy problem. 0 The national 
government is not named. 




Table 2 The participation of domestic interest organizations in consultations on EU policies:  
Multinomial logit regressions 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
EU level consultations only    


































Banking 0.318 -1.751* 
IG position: opposed 
  
-0.731 
IG position: supportive 
  
-0.079 
Government position: opposed 
 
-1.772 
Government position: supportive 
 
-0.293 
IG opposed*government supportive 1.955* 
IG supportive*government opposed 3.101* 
Rights 











EU public interest 
  
0.484 
National government: do something 
 
-1.553* 






EU and national consultations 


































Banking  1.971*** 1.475* 
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IG position: opposed 
  
-0.408 
IG position: supportive 
  
-0.484 
Government position: opposed 
 
0.838 
Government position: supportive 
 
0.751 
IG opposed*government supportive 0.651 
IG supportive*government opposed -0.264 
Rights 











EU public interest 
 
 0.833* 
National government: do something  -0.148 







































Banking  0.155 0.675 
IG position: opposed 
  
0.265 
IG position: supportive 
  
-0.584 
Government position: opposed 
 
-0.041 
Government position: supportive 
 
0.715 
IG opposed*government supportive -0.584 
IG supportive*government opposed -12.567 
Rights 











EU public interest 
 
 0.326 
National government: do something  0.188 








































Note: Based on model 2, margins were calculated for business interest groups in figure 1a [civil society groups 
in figure 1b] active in regulatory policy and business regulation of banking, finance and domestic commerce on a 
non-recast proposal. The groups present evidence and cost-benefit arguments and face a government with the 
mean RILE-value. For civil society groups, the interaction among business and RILE is set to 0, for business 
interests it amounts to the mean RILE-value. Groups attribute policy responsibility to the Commission. For 
corporatism, wealth, and the Europeanisation of policy areas, average effects are included. 
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Appendix table A1  
Table A1 Descriptive statistics of policy and national contexts (2,899 observations) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Min. Max. 
Consultations 0.980 0.897 0 3 
GDP/Capita(log) 3.464 0.208 2.93 3.66 
Corporatism 0.709 2.327 -2.49 3.82 
RILE 0.775 6.858 -9.89 7.91 
Civil society group 0.135 0.342 0 1 
Business group 0.209 0.407 0 1 
RILE*Business group 0.128 3.180 -9.89 7.91 
Environment 0.371 0.483 0 1 
Banking 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Recast 0.219 0.414 0 1 
Regulatory policy 0.905 0.294 0 1 
General regulation 0.302 0.459 0 1 
Public sector regulation 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Europeanisation of policy area 3.714 0.607 1.5 4 
 
                                                          
1 We leave out inter-organizational linkages (e.g. among social democratic parties and trade unions) as the third 
major variety of alignments because we have not assembled data on such linkages. We also assume that interest 
groups which have organizational ties to political parties will be ideologically proximate to them.  
2 The journals are: The Guardian, Daily Telegraph (United Kingdom), Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany), deVolkskrant, NRC Handelsblad (The Netherlands), Dagens Nyheter, Svenska 
Davbladet (Sweden), Delo, Dnevnik (Slovenia).  
3 The descriptive statistics for the 2,899 observations included in model 1 are presented in Appendix table A1.  
